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NEW MEXICO'S ECONOMIC LOSS RULE,
UNCONSCIONABILITY DOCTRINE, AND THE GAP
BETWEEN THEM: CONCEPTS, REALITIES, AND HOW
TO MEND THE GAP
DANIEL M. ALSUP*

I. INTRODUCTION
law between tort and contract where consumers
Mexico
New
in
is
a
void
There
cannot recover for economic loss due to defective products or services. Tort law
fails to protect consumers because the economic loss rule precludes tort claims for
economic loss when claims are based on breach of a contractual duty.' Contract law
fails to protect consumers for two reasons. First, commercial providers of goods and
services can easily limit consumers' remedies.2 Second, New Mexico imposes a
high but unclear standard on consumers attempting to show contract terms are
unconscionable. 3 By considering both the economic loss rule and unconscionability,
the shortcomings of tort and contract become evident. This comment examines both
doctrines, especially as they exist in New Mexico, and evaluates possible methods
of closing the gap in the law's protection by altering one or both rules as they apply
to consumers. 4
Part II of this article provides background on the economic loss rule in general
5
and the various forms it has taken in jurisdictions throughout the country. Part LI
6
sets forth New Mexico's limited economic loss rule jurisprudence. The decisions
are discussed at some length to fully examine why New Mexico courts have applied
the rule to commercial parties of comparable bargaining power, but have left
undecided whether the rule applies to consumers. Part IV examines New Mexico
contract law surrounding modification of consumer remedies and the basic law of
unconscionability. 7 Part V offers reasons the economic loss rule or unconscionability doctrine should be modified as the doctrines apply to consumers, particularly
in light of New Mexico's statutes, case law, and policy.' Part VI discusses the
implications of these alternative solutions.9 Finally, Part VII offers conclusions
about the form the economic loss rule should take in New Mexico and how the law
of unconscionability should be applied to consumers.'°
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1. Town of Alma v. AZCO Constr., Inc., 10 P.3d 1256, 1264 (Colo. 2000); see also Farmers Alliance Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Naylor (Naylor 1), 452 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1171 (D.N.M. 2006).

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

infra Part [V.A.
infra Part V.B.
infra Part V.
infra Part II.
infra Part HI.
infra Part IV.
infra Part V.
infra Part VI.
infra Part VII.

NEW MEXICO LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 38

H. BACKGROUND
A. The Economic Loss Rule's Originsand Development
The economic loss rule precludes tort claims for purely economic loss when the
claims are based on breach of an express or implied contractual duty and no tort
duty independent of the contract is owed by the defendant to the plaintiff."
Economic loss has been variously defined as "the diminution in the value of the
product because it is inferior in quality and does not work for the general purposes
for which it was manufactured and sold," 12 "the difference in value between what
is given and received..., and the difference between the value of what is received
and its value as represented."' 3 Economic loss has also been defined more simply
"as damages other than physical harm to persons or property."' 4
The availability of a tort action can be important. Contract damages are designed
to place the injured party "in as good a position as he would have been in had the
contract been performed."' 5 In contrast, "the law of torts attempts primarily to put
an injured person in a position as nearly as possible equivalent to his position prior
to the tort.' 16 Additionally, punitive damages are sometimes available in tort
actions.' 7
The economic loss rule developed out of products liability law.' 8 Under strict
products liability, "[o]ne engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing
products who sells or distributes a defective product is subject to liability for harm
to persons or property caused by the defect."' 9 Dissatisfaction with the remedies
available to consumers under warranty and negligence law was a major reason for
the development of this theory. 20 However, products liability claims for economic
loss blurred the line between tort and contract, and "if this development were

11. Town of Alma v. AZCO Constr., Inc., 10 P.3d 1256, 1264 (Colo. 2000); see also Naylor 1,452 F. Supp.
2d 1167, 1171 (D.N.M. 2006).
12. Christopher Scott D'Angelo, The Economic Loss Doctrine: Saving Contract Warranty Law from
Drowning in a Sea of Torts, 26 U. TOL. L. REv. 591,592 (1995) (quoting Comment, Manufacturers' Liability to
Remote Purchasersfor "Economic Loss" Damages-Tort or Contract?, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 539, 541 (1966)).
13. Id. at 592 (quoting Note, Economic Loss in ProductsLiabilityJurisprudence,66 COLUM. L. REv. 917,
918 (1966)).
14. AZCO Constr., 10 P.3d at 1264; see also Grynberg v. Questar Pipeline Co., 70 P.3d 1, 11 (Utah 2003)
("[L]oss is strictly economic.., when no damage occurs to persons or property other than the product in question.").
15. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFCONTRAC's § 347 cmt. a (1981).
16.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 cmt. a (1979).

17. id. §§ 908 to 909.
18. AZCO Constr., 10 P.3d at 1259.
19.

RESTATMENT (THIRD) OFTORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1(1998). New Mexico adopted strict
products

liability in 1972 in Stang v. Hertz Corp., 83 N.M. 730, 735, 497 P.2d 732, 737 (1972).
20. Stang, 83 N.M. at 731,497 P.2d at 733; see also Brooks v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 120 N.M. 372, 377,
902 P.2d 54, 59 (1995). Brooks identified four policies underlying strict products liability:
[PIlacing the cost of injuries caused by defective products on the manufacturer who is in a better
position to pass the true product cost on to all distributors, retailers, and consumers of the
product; relieving the injured plaintiffofthe onerous burden of establishing the manufacturer's
negligence; providing full chain of supply protection; and, in the interest of fairness, providing
relief against the manufacturer who-while perhaps innocent of negligence-cast thedefective
product into the stream of commerce and profited thereby.
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allowed to progress too far, contract law would drown in a sea of tort."'" Thus, a
major purpose of the economic loss rule is to maintain the distinction between tort
law and contract law.22 The rule accomplishes this by limiting plaintiffs to contract
claims when the economic loss suffered is simply a failure of the purchaser to
receive the benefit of its bargain.23
The economic loss rule was first articulated by the California Supreme Court in
the 1965 case of Seely v. White Motor Co. 24 Seely was a products liability case in
which a defective truck overturned, causing the plaintiff damages for the cost of
repairing the truck and for lost profits. Chief Justice Traynor reasoned that the tort
theory of strict liability26 did not apply because the solely economic damages
resulted from a failure of the truck to perform, which is an interest protected by
contract law and not tort law.27 The Seely approach was adopted by the
overwhelming majority of jurisdictions over the next twenty years.28
The rule gained momentum when a unanimous United States Supreme Court
adopted an approach similar to Seely in 1986.29 In examining the different nature of
the duties owed under contract and tort, the Court reasoned that "[w]hen a product
injures only itself the reasons for imposing a tort duty are weak and those for
leaving the party to its contractual remedies are strong."3 This evaluation was based
on several factors. For one, "[t]he tort concern with safety is reduced when an injury
is only to the product itself."'" Further, a purchaser of a product can insure against
economic losses.32 Another factor favoring contract over tort is that a "warranty
action also has a built-in limitation on liability [in the form of the parties' agreement
and the requirement that consequential damages be a foreseeable result of the
breach], whereas a tort action could subject the manufacturer to damages of an
indefinite amount."33 Also, commercial parties "may set the terms of their own
agreements," so there is "no reason to intrude into the parties' allocation of the

21. E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 866 (1986) (citing GRANT GILMORE,
THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 87-94 (1974)).
22. See Grynberg v. Questar Pipeline Co., 70 P.3d 1, 11 (Utah 2003) (The economic loss rule's "underlying
reasoning" is that "tort
law should govern the duties and liabilities imposed by legislatures and courts upon nonconsenting members of society, and contract law should govern the bargained-for duties and liabilities of persons
who exercise freedom of contract.").
23. See Robinson Helicopter Co., Inc. v. Dana Corp., 102 P.3d 268, 272 (Cal. 2004).
24. 403 P.2d 145 (Cal. 1965). The court stated, "Even in actions for negligence, a manufacturer's liability
is limited to damages for physical injuries and there is no recovery for economic loss alone." Id. at 151. The
economic loss rule was born from this statement. Town of Alma v. AZCO Constr., Inc., 10 P.3d 1256, 1260 (Colo.
2000).
25. Seely, 403 P.2d at 147-48.
26. In addition to creating the economic loss rule, Traynor is credited with developing the doctrine of strict
products liability. Henry J. Friendly, Ablest Judge of His Generation, 71 CAL. L. REV.1039, 1043 (1983).
27. Seely, 403 P.2d at 151.
28. D'Angelo, supranote 12, at 593 (citing Casa Clara Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. Charley Toppino& Sons, Inc.,
620 So. 2d 1244, 1246 n.2 (Fla. 1993)).
29. E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858,871 (1986) ("[W]e adopt an approach
similar to Seely and hold that a manufacturer in a commercial relationship has no duty under either a negligence
or strict products-liability theory to prevent a product from injuring itself.").
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 874.
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risk."34 Finally, as a matter of policy, "[t]he increased cost to the public that would
result from holding a manufacturer liable in tort for injury to the product itself is not
justified., 35 The bright line rule precluding recovery of economic loss damages in
tort actions and "limiting recovery to what might be obtained under the law of
contracts"
is the majority rule,36 and has been adopted by the Restatement (Third)
37
of Torts.

Courts considering whether to allow recovery of economic loss caused by
damage to the product itself have taken two other approaches, labeled minority and
intermediate.38 At the other end of the spectrum from Seely and East River, the
minority approach "allows the recovery of economic losses in a tort action under
all circumstances. ' 39 This approach began with Santor v. A & M Karagheusian,
Inc.,4° decided the same year as Seely. Santorinvolved a products liability claim for
defective carpet. 4' The court held that a manufacturer's tort duty to make nondefective products included the duty to protect against injury to the product itself.42
The purpose of holding manufacturers liable for defective products "is to insure that
the cost of injuries or damage, either to the goods sold or to other property, resulting
from defective products, is borne by the makers of the products.... rather than by
the injured or damaged persons who ordinarily are powerless to protect
themselves. 4 3 In other words, the rationales behind strict liability apply just as
forcefully when the harm is purely economic as when harm occurs to persons or
other property, and no distinction between the two situations is warranted." Santor
and the rule it espoused has "attracted very few adherents. 4 5
The intermediate approach adopted by several jurisdictions allows economic loss
"damages to be recovered in tort actions only if the defective product created an
unreasonable risk of harm to persons or property other than the defective product. 46
This approach distinguishes between products that simply disappoint the buyer's
economic expectations and those that are dangerous to people and property. 47 For
example, in Maryland "[e]ven where a recovery, based on a defective product, is
considered to be for economic loss, a plaintiff may still recover in tort if the defect

34. Id. at 872-73.
35. Id. at 872.
36. Utah Int'l, Inc. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 108 N.M. 539,541,775 P.2d 741,743 (Ct. App. 1989) (citing
Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145 (Cal. 1965)).
37. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABIuTY § 21(1998).
38. See Utah Int'l, 108 N.M. at 541, 775 P.2d at 743 (citing E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval,

Inc., 476 U.S. 858 (1986)).
39.

Utah Int'l, 108 N.M. at 541, 775 P.2d at 743 (citing Santor v. A & M Karagheusian,Inc., 207 A.2d

305 (N.J. 1965)).
40. 207 A.2d 305 (N.J. 1965).
41. Id. at 306-07.

42. Id. at 312.
43. Id.

44. See id.
45. REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OFToRTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 21 cmt. d (1998). Even New Jersey has since

overruled Santor, recognizing that "[o]nly a handful of jurisdictions have followed" that case. Alloway v. Gen.
Marine Indus., L.P., 695 A.2d 264,271 (N.J. 1997) (holding that a tort action is unavailable when purely economic
damages result from a defective product that creates no unreasonable risk of harm to persons or property).
46. Utah Int'l, Inc. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 108 N.M. 539,541,775 P.2d 741,743 (Ct. App. 1989) (citing
N. Power & Eng'g Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 623 P.2d 324 (Alaska 1981)).
47. Utah Int'l, 108 N.M. at 541, 775 P.2d at 743.
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creates a substantial and unreasonable risk of death or personal injury."48 The
justification for this approach is that it provides further incentive for manufacturers
to produce safe products.49 However, the United States Supreme Court has
explicitly rejected the intermediate approach because it is "too indeterminate to
enable manufacturers easily to structure their business behavior."50 Further, "[e]ven
when the harm to the product itself occurs through an abrupt, accident-like event,
the resulting loss.., is essentially the failure of the purchaser to receive the benefit
of its bargain-traditionally the core concern of contract law." 5' Most courts have
declined to create exceptions to the bright-line economic loss rule, especially after
East River, and some courts that previously followed the intermediate approach
have since realigned with the majority rule. 2
An important issue in products liability cases is whether the economic loss rule
applies when a component part injures the entire product, or when the plaintiff is
not the original purchaser and suffers damages to objects added to the product
subsequent to the original sale by the defendant.5 3 The United States Supreme Court
shed light on the issue in Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J.M. Martinac & Co.5 4 In
Saratogathe defendant sold a ship to an individual, who placed a skiff, fishing net,
and spare parts on it, and then resold the ship to the plaintiff.55 A fire in the engine
room sunk the ship, and the plaintiff sued in tort for damage to the skiff, net, and
spare parts, arguing the equipment was "other property" for purposes of the
economic loss rule.56 The Supreme Court agreed with the plaintiff, holding:
When a manufacturer places an item in the stream of commerce by selling it to
an Initial User, that item is the "product itself' under East River. Items added to
the product by the Initial User are therefore "other property," and the Initial
User's sale of the product to a Subsequent User does not change these
characterizations.

48. U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 647 A.2d 405,410 (Md. 1994) (asbestos).
49. Bocre Leasing Corp. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 645 N.E.2d 1195, 1197 (N.Y. 1995) (discussing but
rejecting intermediate approach).
50. E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 870 (1986).
51. Id.
52. D'Angelo, supra note 12, at 601-02. D'Angelo asserts that, "[e]specially if applied in the context of
product liability cases, the [intermediate approach] not only is counter to the majority rule, but also destroys the
certainty and risk allocation sought to be established by the U.C.C. and contract law." D'Angelo, supra note 12,
at 607. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTs: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 21 cmt. d (1998) (recognizing that "[a]
plausible argument can be made that products that are dangerous, rather than merely ineffectual, should be
governed by the rules governing products liability law," but concluding that "the rules of this Restatement do not
apply in such situations").
53. See, e.g., Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J.M. Martinac & Co., 520 U.S. 875 (1997); Utah Int'l, Inc. v.
Caterpillar Tractor Co., 108 N.M. 539, 775 P.2d 741 (Ct. App. 1989); Grams v. Milk Prods., Inc., 699 N.W.2d 167
(Wis. 2005). The one product that nearly all courts hold harms other property is asbestos. D'Angelo, supranote
12, at 601. Despite the argument that asbestos causes purely economic loss to the product itself (the building), most
courts find that asbestos harms the entire building as other property. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRoDuCTS
LtABnIT § 21 cmt. e (1998). This narrow exception is justified by the uniquely serious health threat asbestos
contamination presents. Id.
54. 520 U.S. 875 (1997).
55. Id. at 877.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 879.
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When an entire product is damaged by a component part, some courts apply the
"integrated system" rule, meaning "[i]f the 'product' at issue is a defective
component in a larger 'system,' the other components are not regarded as 'other
property' in a legal sense, even if they are different property in a literal sense."58
Other courts simply look to the product purchased by the plaintiff rather than the
product sold by the defendant. 9 The Restatement follows this approach. 6° Finally,
in what amounts to an extension of the rule, a few courts have adopted the concept
of "disappointed expectations," which denies tort recovery when a "product causes
property damage but the damage was within the scope of bargaining, or... 'the
occurrence of such damage could have been the subject of negotiations between the
parties. "'61
B. Applying the Economic Loss Rule Outside ProductsLiability
Although originally applied in products liability actions, the economic loss rule
has more recently been extended to numerous other contexts. 62 Because of the rule's
origins in products liability, courts have focused on the nature of the harm to
determine whether plaintiffs could pursue tort actions, or were restricted to contract
remedies.63 However, the type of damages suffered does not conclusively determine
the availability of a tort action in all cases.' Confusion arises outside products
liability cases because "some torts are expressly designed to remedy pure economic
loss. ' ' 65 Courts can avoid this confusion "by recognizing and applying the
underlying premise of the economic loss doctrine: successful separation of contract
and tort law requires identification of the underlying duties governing the parties'
relationship."' Thus, "the modem focus is not on
the harm that occurs but instead
67
is on the source of the duty that was breached.,
A review of the purposes of tort and contract law is illuminating. On one hand,
tort obligations are "designed to protect all citizens from the risk of physical harm
to their persons or to their property... [and] are imposed by law without regard to

58. Grams, 699 N.w.2d at 174.
59. See D'Angelo, supra note 12, at 599 (citing King v. Hilton-Davis, 855 F.2d 1047, 1051 (3d Cir. 1988));
see also Utah Int'l, Inc. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 108 N.M. 539, 542, 775 P.2d 741, 744 (Ct. App. 1989) ("We
will not.. .engage in dissecting a commercial unit into its component parts to determine if one component injured
another.").
60. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCrS LIABILITY § 21 cmt. e (1998).

61. Grams, 699 N.W.2d at 175 (quoting Neibarger v. Universal Coops., Inc., 486 N.W.2d 612,620 (Mich.
1992)).
62. R. Joseph Barton, Note, Drowning in a Sea of Contract:Application of the Economic Loss Rule to
Fraudand Negligent MisrepresentationClaims,41 WM. &MARY L. REv. 1789, 1802 (2000) ("Although the rule
originated in the context of products liability, the current trend expands the rule to apply in other contexts, most
notably in real property transactions and service contracts.").
63. See Grynberg v. Questar Pipeline Co., 70 P.3d 1, 11 (Utah 2003).
64. Town of Alma v. AZCO Constr., Inc., 10 P.3d 1256, 1263 (Colo. 2000).
65. Id. (listing "professional negligence, fraud, and breach of fiduciary duty"); Grynberg, 70 P.3d at 11
("Focusing on the character of the harm.. .made it difficult to apply the economic loss doctrine beyond the realm
of products liability, where torts such as fraud and conversion exist to remedy purely economic losses in noncontractual settings.").
66. Grynberg, 70 P.3d at II(citations omitted).
67. Id.; AZCO Constr., 10 P.3d at 1263 ([C]onfusion can be avoided.. .by maintaining the focus on the
source of the duty alleged to have been violated.").
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any agreement or contract.""8 On the other hand, "contract obligations arise from
promises made between parties. Contract law is intended to enforce the expectancy
interests created by the parties' promises so that they can allocate risks and costs
during their bargaining."69 Thus, "[t]he key to determining the availability of a
contract or tort action lies in determining the source of the duty that forms the basis
of the action."70 Viewed in this light, it makes sense that in products liability
actions, application of the economic loss rule turns on the nature of damages.
Outside this context, however, the rule's applicability cannot be determined simply
by reference to "whether the damages are physical or economic."'" The source of
the duty must be identified.
The economic loss rule's extension to contexts outside products liability based
on the source of the duty breached requires a re-articulation of the rule. For
example, the Colorado Supreme Court, in Town of Alma v. AZCO Construction,
Inc.,72 phrased the rule this way:
We hold that a party suffering only economic loss from the breach of an express
or implied contractual duty may not assert a tort claim for such a breach absent
an independent duty of care under tort law. Economic loss is defined generally
as damages other than physical harm to persons or property.73
In sharp contrast, other jurisdictions, including New Mexico, have not delineated
the precise boundaries of the economic loss rule. Accordingly, the scope of
situations to which the rule applies in this state remains unclear.
A final issue concerning the scope of the economic loss rule is whether the rule
should bar tort claims brought by consumers against commercial parties. The vast
majority of jurisdictions make no distinction between consumers and commercial
parties when applying the rule.74 Again, New Mexico law on this point is unclear.

68. AZCO Constr., 10 P.3d at 1262.
69. Id.
70. Id. In fact, the AZCO Construction court "believe[d] that a more accurate designation of what is
commonly termed the 'economic loss rule' would be the 'independent duty rule."' Id. at 1262 n.8. "[I]ts continued
designation as the 'economic loss' rule is merely an unfortunate carry-over from its origins in products liability
jurisprudence." Id. at 1263 n.9.
71. Tommy L. Griffin Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Jordan, Jones & Goulding, Inc., 463 S.E.2d 85,88 (S.C.
1995).
72. 10P.3d 1256.
73. Id. at 1264. "The scope of [Colorado's] rule includes third-party contract beneficiaries who may have
a cause of action for breach of contractual duties." Id. at n. 12. For a similar articulation of the rule, see Tommy L
Griffin, 463 S.E.2d at 88:
[T]he question of whether the plaintiff may maintain an action in tort for purely economic loss
turns on the determination of the source of the duty plaintiff claims the defendant owed. A
breach of a duty which arises under the provisions of a contract between the parties must be
redressed under contract, and a tort action will not lie. A breach of a duty arising independently
of any contract duties between the parties, however, may support a tort action.
74. Alloway v. Gen. Marine Indus., L.P., 695 A.2d 264,270 (N.J. 1997) ("The vast majority of courts across
the country.. have concluded that purchasers of personal property, whether commercial entities or consumers,
should be limited to recovery under contract principles.") (citations omitted). But see Sherman v. Johnson &
Towers Baltimore, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 499,502 (D. Md. 1990) ("It is the corporations and not consumers which the
Court had in mind when issuing the ruling in EastRiver.").
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III. NEW MEXICO'S ECONOMIC LOSS RULE
A. Precedent
No coherent definition of New Mexico's economic loss rule has been formulated
by our courts' limited case law dealing with the rule." Courts have applied the rule
almost hesitantly, offering few broad guidelines.7 6 However, by closely examining
courts' reasons for applying or withholding the rule in the eight opinions construing
New Mexico law, a statement can be made of the rule's current form, as well as its
likely future form."

Before 1989, no New Mexico appellate court had dealt with the rule.78 Prior to
this, however, three federal courts predicted the position New Mexico courts would
take on the issue. In Colonial Park Country Club v. Joan of Arc,79 the plaintiff
country club sued a food supplier in tort after contaminated food poisoned thirtythree customers of the club, two of whom died. 80 The plaintiff sought damages for
economic loss suffered as a result of restocking the kitchen, paying employees while
the club was under quarantine, borrowing money to keep the club open, and losing
memberships. 8' The Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court that New Mexico
would apply the majority rule and bar the plaintiff from recovering these economic
losses in products liability.82 The court gave deference to the district court's
determination 83 and was influenced by the fact that Section 402(A) of the
Restatement applies to "liability for physical harm."84
Allen v. Toshiba Corp.85 involved tort and contract claims for economic loss
brought by a retail office equipment dealer against defendants involved in
manufacturing and distributing defective photocopiers.86 The District Court for the
District of New Mexico recognized the different approaches represented by Seely
and Santor,but noted that "[b]y far, the majority of courts have followed Seely and
held that economic losses are not recoverable under theories of recovery based on
the law of torts.,, 87 The court concluded that "[t]he better-reasoned authority and the
vast majority of cases which have addressed the issue stand firmly against the
proposition" that tort theories of recovery may be asserted for economic losses
alone.88
The next federal case construing New Mexico law regarding the economic loss
rule created an exception to the rules applied in ColonialPark Country Club and
Allen. In Sharon Steel Corp. v. Lakeshore, Inc.,89 the plaintiff asserted theories of

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

See infra text accompanying notes 78-152.
See infra text accompanying notes 78-152.
See infra Part IH.B.
See Utah Int'l, Inc. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 108 N.M. 539, 541,775 P.2d 741,743 (Ct. App. 1989).
746 F.2d 1425 (10th Cir. 1984).
Id. at 1427.
Id.
Id. at 1429.
Id.
Id.
599 F. Supp. 381 (D.N.M. 1984).
Id. at 383.
Id. at 385.

88. Id.

89. 753 F.2d 851 (10th Cir. 1985).
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strict liability and negligence after a piece of mining equipment failed, causing other
equipment to fall as much as 600 feet down a mine shaft.9" The court recognized
that it had recently held "that New Mexico law does not permit recovery of
economic loss in products liability cases tried on the basis of strict liability."9' The
court nonetheless allowed recovery for economic losses under a negligence theory,
reasoning "that tort law supports recovery of damages that could be characterized
as economic loss when, because of a negligently manufactured product, plaintiff is
subjected to an unreasonable risk of injury to his person or property."92 Essentially,
the court predicted 93
New Mexico would endorse the intermediate approach to the
economic loss rule.
A New Mexico state appellate court spoke to the issue when the court of appeals
adopted a version of the economic loss rule in 1989 in Utah International,Inc. v.
CaterpillarTractor Co. 94 The defendant had designed and manufactured a coal
hauler, then sold it to the plaintiff.95 The machine caught on fire when a hydraulic
hose ruptured, injuring the machine and interrupting the plaintiff s business.96 The
plaintiff sought damages for replacement of the machine and loss of its use,
asserting causes of action including negligence, strict liability, and negligent failure
to warn. 97 The court of appeals first discussed the majority, minority, and
intermediate approaches to the economic loss rule.98 The court then recognized and
found persuasive both ColonialParkand Allen, where federal courts had construed
New Mexico law in endorsing the majority approach. 99 The court of appeals also
acknowledged that in Sharon Steel the Tenth Circuit had predicted New Mexico
would adopt the intermediate approach and create an exception to the rule where the
product "defect creates an unreasonable risk of injury to persons or other
property."'" However, the court found that "[tihe persuasiveness of Sharon Steel
ha[d] been undermined by a recent unanimous United States Supreme Court
decision, East River," and therefore declined to follow Sharon Steel.'0 '
After conducting a survey of economic-loss-rule jurisprudence in general, and
of decisions applicable to New Mexico in particular, the court purported to adopt
the majority bright-line rule, finding the "reasoning in East River compelling."' 2
The court adopted the rule for the usual reasons cited: "in order to allow
commercial parties to freely contract and allocate the risk of defective products as
they wish"; 0 3 because a "buyer may bargain for additional warranties from the

90. Id. at 852-53.
91. Id. at 852 (citing Colonial Park Country Club v. Joan of Arc, 746 F.2d 1425 (10th Cir. 1984)).
92. SharonSteel, 753 F.2d at 855 (citing Penn. Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d 1165,
1171-72 (3d Cir. 1981), abrogatedby Aloe Coal Co. v. Clark Equip. Co., 816 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1987)).
93. See supratext accompanying notes 46-52.
94. 108 N.M. 539, 775 P.2d 741 (Ct. App. 1989).
95. Id. at 542, 775 P.2d at 743.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 541-42, 775 P.2d at 743-44.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 542, 775 P.2d at 744.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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seller and pay a higher price, or may forego warranty protection entirely in order to
obtain a lower purchase price"; °" and because "[insurance against economic loss
is readily available..., and in a commercial setting.. .insurance provides adequate
protection to the party who suffers a loss from injury of a product to itself."'1 5 Other
important considerations were achieving consistency in the area and the "clear trend
toward the approach of East River."' 6 Thus, the economic loss rule barred the
plaintiff's
actions for strict products liability, negligence, and negligent failure to
107
warn.

Despite this endorsement of East River and the majority approach, the court of
appeals qualified the bright-line rule in several very important respects by
formulating the rule as follows:
[W]e hold that, in commercial transactions, when there is no great disparity in
bargaining power of the parties.... economic losses from injury of a product to
itself are not recoverable in tort actions; damages for such economic losses in
commercial settings in New Mexico may only be recovered in contract
actions. 08
Even with the qualifications embedded in this articulation of the economic loss rule,
the court cautioned, "We specifically do not address the question of whether the
same rule should apply to non-commercial consumers who suffer similar
injuries.""1 9
Although the Utah Internationalcourt adopted the economic loss rule, it is clear
from the court's formulation of the rule and the precautionary statement afterwards
that the rule was not intended to be applied broadly. When the party urging
application of the rule in a certain case is in a position of superior bargaining power
during contract formation, or where at least the plaintiff is commercially unsophisticated, it seems the economic loss rule should not be used to deny recovery in tort.
The next New Mexico appellate case involving the economic loss rule was In re
ConsolidatedVista Hills Retaining Wall Litigation.1 ' Among other issues, the case
involved a home builder's third-party claim for indemnification against the
suppliers of defective materials used in the construction of homes. 11' The trial court
had ruled that the economic loss rule barred the indemnification claim,112 so the
plaintiff urged the supreme court to overrule UtahInternational.113 The court in fact
reaffirmed Utah International,because "parties should not be allowed to use tort

104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 543, 775 P.2d at 745. The economic loss rule barred the claim for negligent failure to warn

because "the same policy considerations which apply to defects in manufacturing also apply to failure to warn of
defects." Id.
108. Id. at 542, 775 P.2d at 744.

109. Id. Utah Internationalhas been cited as an example of a case making "a distinction between commercial
transactions and consumer transactions, [and] allowing tort recovery for consumer transactions." Trans States
Airlines v. Pratt & Whitney Canada, Inc., 682 N.E.2d 45, 53-54 (M1.1997).
110. 119N.M. 542, 893 P.2d438 (1995).
111. Id. at 545,893 P.2d at 441.
112. Id.at548-49,893P.2dat445-46.
113. Id. at 549,893 P.2d at 446.
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law to alter or avoid the bargain struck in the contract," and if Utah International
were overruled, "contract law would be subsumed by strict liability and
negligence."' 4
As to whether the economic loss rule bars a claim for indemnification, the
supreme court first noted that the purpose of the rule is not to completely "bar the
recovery of economic-loss damages; rather, the rule bars recovery of such damages
in tort."'1 15 "By contrast, the purpose of indemnification is to prevent an unjust result
by shifting liability from one not at fault to one at fault.""' 6 The court further
explained:
Although a person cannot be held liable for economic-loss damages in tort
because of the economic-loss rule, when that person is held liable for economicloss damages in contract, and that person's liability is attributable to the fault of
another, it would be unjust not to allow indemnification. We therefore hold that
the economic-loss rule does not bar a claim for indemnification.17
The supreme court thus gave some definition to the scope of the economic loss rule
in New Mexico. The decision is based on the unjust results the rule would generate
if parties not at fault for their own economic damages were nonetheless denied
recovery. 8 The supreme court's overriding concern for fairness and avoiding harsh
results should guide future courts when further delineating the precise boundaries
of the economic loss rule.
The next New Mexico case dealing with the economic loss rule was Spectron
Development Laboratory v. American Hollow Boring Co.' 9 Here, the plaintiff
purchased a light-gas gun from the defendant. 20 The gun exploded, damaging itself,
the building housing it, and other objects in the building, as well as interrupting the
plaintiff's business. 12' The plaintiff and its insurers brought actions for strict
products liability, negligence, and breach of express and implied warranties. 22 In
a brief, one-paragraph analysis, the court denied recovery "in strict products liability
for any injury to the light-gas gun or any interruption of business that can be
attributed to the injury to the gun."' 123 In support of this conclusion the court cited
the Restatement (Third) of Torts and Utah International.124 Notably, the Spectron

114. Id.
115. Id. at 550, 893 P.2d at 447.
116. Id. (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OFTORTS § 51, at 341 (5th ed.
1984)).
117. In re Consol. Vista Hills Retaining Wall Litig., 119 N.M. at 550, 893 P.2d at 447.
118. See id.
119. 1997-NMCA-025, 936 P.2d 852. The court never uses the term "economic loss rule," but the rule is
clearly at issue from the court's language and the authorities it cites.
120. Id. 1 3, 936 P.2d at 855. A light-gas gun fires projectiles at high speeds "to study the impact
characteristics of materials that may be selected for such purposes as military armor or meteorite shielding for space
vehicles." Id. 2, 936 P.2d at 854.
121. Id. l 1-6, 936 P.2d at 854-55.
122. Id. fl 4-6, 936 P.2d at 855.
123. Id. 20, 936 P.2d at 857.

124. Id. The Spectron court cited a Tentative Draft of the Restatement, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS
(Tentative Draft No. 2, § 6(c) and cmt. d), which is now RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABuTY

§ 21 cmt. d (1998). The court cited the Restatement for the proposition that "harm to persons or property does not
include harm to the defective product itself." 1997-NMCA-025, 1 20, 936 P.2d at 857.
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court retained the language from Utah Internationallimiting the economic loss rule
to "commercial transactions between parties with comparable bargaining power."' 25
The court then effectively expanded the rule in New Mexico by denying recovery
in strict products liability for damage to the building and its contents. 12 6 The court
barred recovery for this other property despite the fact that the Restatement
provision relied upon to deny recovery for economic loss for the product itself
allows recovery of damage to "the plaintiffs property other than the defective
product itself., 12 7 The Spectron court reasoned that the transaction was commercial
in nature, and the plaintiff not only "had more expertise than any other entity in this
country regarding light-gas guns," but did not "suffer from having substantially less
bargaining power than its supplier."' 128 Thus, the court found "no reason not to leave
it to the contract negotiations between the parties to determine who should bear the
cost of property damage to [the plaintiff] from a defective product." 129 The holding
on this point tacitly approves of the "disappointed expectations" concept adopted
by a handful of courts. 30 The defendants in Spectron were not liable in negligence
for the same reasons they were not liable in strict liability.' 3 '
Curiously, the economic loss rule appears not to have been applied by any New
Mexico appellate court since Spectron. However, after a nearly decade-long hiatus,
a federal district court construing New Mexico law recently held that the rule
applies to service contracts. 32 In Naylor I, the plaintiff hired the defendant to
investigate the origin of a fire that destroyed the plaintiff's furniture store. 3 3 The
plaintiff brought actions for negligence and breach of warranty because the
defendant failed to preserve several objects related to the fire's origin. 134 The
defendant claimed the economic loss rule barred the negligence claim. 135 The court
recognized that New Mexico has adopted the economic loss rule, but has not
indicated whether the rule applies to contracts for service, as opposed to goods. 136
The court held that it does, reasoning that "[t]he legal and policy considerations that
motivated New Mexico courts to adopt the economic loss rule in the products

125. Spectron, 1997-NMCA-025, 20, 936 P.2d at 857 (citing Utah Int'l, Inc. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.,
108 N.M. 539, 542, 775 P.2d 741, 744 (Ct. App. 1989)).
126. Id. 21, 936 P.2d at 857.
127. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILrrY § 21(c) (1998); see also id. § 21 cmt. e ("A
product that fails to function and causes harm to surrounding property has clearly caused harm to other
property... .The characterization of a claim as harm to other property may trigger liability not only for the harm to
physical property but also for incidental economic loss.").
128. 1997-NMCA-025, 25, 936 P.2d at 858.
129. Id.
130. See Neibarger v. Universal Coops., Inc., 486 N.W.2d 612, 620 (Mich. 1992); Grams v. Milk Prods.,
Inc., 699 N.W.2d 167, 175 (Wis. 2005) (No tort action is available in "situations in which a commercial product
causes property damage but the damage was within the scope of bargaining, or... 'the occurrence of such damage
could have been the subject of negotiations between the parties."'). The United States Supreme Court has rejected
this approach. See Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J.M. Martinac & Co., 520 U.S. 875, 882 (1997) ("No court has thought
that the mere possibility of [a contract term apportioning loss a defective product causes to other property]
precluded tort recovery for damage to an Initial User's other property.").
131. 1997-NMCA-028, 25, 936 P.2d at 859.
132. Naylor 1, 452 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1173 (D.N.M. 2006).
133. Id. at 1169.
134. Id. at 1169-70.
135. Id. at 1170.
136. Id. at 1172.
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liability context apply equally to service contracts."' 3 7 In particular, "parties to
service contracts realize the same commercial benefits from the economic loss rule
as parties to contracts for the sale of goods."' 38 These commercial benefits include
the ability "to freely contract, allocate risk based on the contractual agreement, and
' The
obtain a purchase price that reflects the contractual bargained-for exchange." 39
to
an
agreement
court "conclude[d] that under New Mexico law, when the parties
are sophisticated commercial entities, the economic loss rule applies both to
contracts for services as well as to contracts for the sale of goods.""
Rather than barring the plaintiff's tort claim based on its conclusion that service
contracts are subject to the economic loss rule, the court turned to a different line
of analysis. The court differentiated contracts for the sale of goods, where parties
can "contractually define the expectations arising out of the commercial
relationship," from service contracts, which often involve "licensed professionals
who owe to their customers a duty of care that exists apart from the contractual
agreements underlying their commercial relationship."' 14 ' Next, and most
importantly, the court recognized that tort claims based on an independent duty of
care are outside the scope of the economic loss rule.'42 Significantly, focus was
shifted away from the type of loss suffered and onto the source of the duty
breached-the "modern focus" of the economic loss rule that enables the rule to be
applied outside products liability. 43 The court "conclude[d] that although the
economic loss rule applies to service contracts, the rule does not bar tort claims
arising from an independent duty of care."'" Because the parties had not briefed
whether the defendant, a certified fire investigator, qualified as a professional, the
summary judgment motion on the negligence claim was dismissed.'45 After the
parties briefed the issue in subsequent motions, the court found that certified fire
investigators are professionals "under New Mexico law and therefore subject to a
professional standard of care."' 146 The economic loss rule thus did not bar the
plaintiff s claim for professional negligence, even though the parties
47 contracted for
nature.
in
economic
was
suffered
harm
only
the
and
the service
The Nayloropinions are important for several reasons. First, they include service
contracts within the scope of the economic loss rule. Second, they shift the focus
away from whether the plaintiff's harm was solely economic and toward the source
of the duty alleged to have been breached. This step is critical for the application

137. Id. at 1173. But see Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Cease Elec., Inc., 688 N.W.2d 462,467 (Wis. 2004) (noting
the "split among the jurisdictions as to whether the economic loss doctrine applies to contracts for services"). The
Cease Electric court ultimately "determine[d] that the economic loss doctrine is inapplicable to claims for the
negligent provision of services." Id. at 472.
138. Naylor 1,452 F. Supp. 2d at 1173.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1174.
141. Id.
142. Id. (quoting Hermansen v. Tasulis, 48 P.3d 235, 240 (Utah 2002)).
143. Grynberg v. Questar Pipeline Co., 70 P.3d 1, 11 (Utah 2003).
144. Naylorl, 452 F. Supp. 2d at 1174.
145. Id.
480 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1291 (D.N.M. 2007).
146. Farmers Alliance Mut. Ins. Co. v. Naylor (Naylor 11),
147. Id. at 1292.
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of the economic loss rule to contexts outside strict products liability.' 48 Finally, the
Naylor opinions specifically retain the language limiting the rule to suits between
sophisticated commercial parties.' The court explained in the second opinion that
allowing tort claims against professionals does not undermine the rule's underlying
policy rationale because "[c]ourts crafted the economic loss rule to apply to
commercial transactions where the parties share equal bargaining power."' 50 There
is not equal bargaining power in the typical professional-client service relationship
because "the recipient frequently lacks the ability to anticipate risks inherent in the
provision of those services," so "the parties [are prevented] from allocating those
risks in the terms of the contract.""'5 Placing tort claims based on independent duties
outside the scope of the economic loss rule ensures "that the rule applies only to
those situations where the parties to a commercial transaction share equal
bargaining power."152

B. New Mexico's CurrentEconomic Loss Rule
New Mexico's economic loss rule can be synthesized from the piecemeal
application of the rule by the courts discussed above. The rule precludes recovery
of economic loss: (1) when there is no great disparity in bargaining power between
commercial parties to a contract for the sale of goods and the damages arise from
injury of a product to itself; 153 and (2) when the parties to a service contract are
sophisticated commercial entities5 4 and the tort claim is not based on an
independent duty of care. 55 The rule potentially bars tort claims for injury to other
property when the parties should have allocated that risk through negotiation. 5 6 The
economic loss rule does not bar claims for indemnification. 15
The foregoing cases make clear that the precise parameters of New Mexico's
economic loss rule are currently undefined. For example, what happens when
parties contractually disclaim economic loss damages? Should the rule apply
between non-commercial parties? Between non-commercial parties who actually do
bargain and contractually allocate risk? Would the rule be unfair when applied in
combination with disclaimers of warranties and other limitations on contract
recovery? New Mexico law, and the policies underlying it, inform the answers to
these questions, and give some definition to the scope of this state's economic loss
rule.

11.

148.

See Town of Alma v. AZCO Constr., Inc., 10 P.3d 1256, 1262-63 (Colo. 2000); Grynberg, 70 P.3d at

149.

Naylor 1,452 F. Supp. 2d at 1174; Naylor II, 480 F. Supp. 2d at 1289.

150. NaylorII,480F. Supp. 2d at 1292.
151. Id. (citing Steiner Corp. v. Johnson & Higgins of Cal., 196 F.R.D. 653, 658 n.7 (D. Utah 2000)).
152. NaylorIl,480 F. Supp. 2d at 1293 (citing Utah Int'l, Inc. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 108 N.M. 539, 542,
775 P.2d 741,744 (Ct. App. 1989)).
153. Spectron Dev. Lab. v. Am. Hollow Boring Co., 1997-NMCA-025, 20, 936 P.2d 852,857; Utah Int'l,
108 N.M. at 542, 775 P.2d at 744.
154. Naylor 1 452 F. Supp. 2d at 1174.
155. Naylor I, 480 F. Supp. 2d at 1290.

156. See Spectron, 1997-NMCA-025, ' 21-26,936 P.2d at 857-59. This is only a potential facet of New
Mexico's economic loss rule because the Spectron court never specifically invokes the rule. See supra text
accompanying notes 119-131.
157. In re Consol. Vista Hills Retaining Wall Litig., 119 N.M. 542, 551, 893 P.2d 438, 447 (1995).
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IV. CONTRACT'S SHORTCOMINGS
A. CommercialEntities Can Easily Limit Consumers' ContractRemedies
The economic loss rule restricts injured parties to contract remedies when purely
economic loss results from breach of a contractual duty. 158 At first glance, there
seems to be no inequity in applying the rule, since contract damages presumably
place the injured party "in as good a position as he would have been in had the
contract been performed."' 159 Inequity results when a supplier of goods or services
contractually limits or eliminates a consumer's ability to recover, or contract claims
are otherwise barred.' 6° A commercial entity's ability to shape the terms of a
contract to its own overwhelming advantage in fact denies contract recovery, and
near the position they would have been in had the
injured plaintiffs end up nowhere
161
contract not been breached.
A consideration of the tools a commercial supplier of goods has under the
162
For example,
Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") illustrates the point.
163
New
a
warranty,
is
there
when
Even
disclaimed.
be
completely
can
warranties
party
third
for
alternatives
UCC
of
three
restrictive
most
the
adopted
has
Mexico
beneficiaries." 6 A seller's warranty only covers physical injuries to a purchaser's
family, household members, and guests, and only when "it is reasonable to expect
by the goods."' 165 Damages can
that such person may use, consume or be affected
66 or limited.'67 Remedies can be limited. 168
be contractually liquidated'
Consequential damages can be outright excluded. 169 The normal four-year statute
of limitations can be reduced, but not extended. 7 0 Even worse, the "cause of action
accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party's lack of
knowledge of the breach.""'' Using any or all of these mechanisms, a commercial
seller can draft a one-sided contract enforceable against a consumer.
Limitations on recovery also exist outside the context of contracts for the sale of
goods. For example, contract damages are limited to "what is reasonably within the

158. Town of Alma v. AZCO Constr., Inc., 10 P.3d 1256, 1264 (Colo. 2000).
159. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 cmt. a (1981).

160. See, e.g., Clarys v. Ford Motor Co., 592 N.W.2d 573 (N.D. 1999) (tort recovery barred by economic
loss rule even though warranty claims barred by statute of limitations); Alloway v. Gen. Marine Indus., L.P., 695
A.2d 264 (N.J. 1997) (tort recovery barred by economic loss rule even though warranty claims for consumer's
sunken boat unavailable); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 592 N.W.2d 201 (Wis. 1999) (tort
recovery barred by economic loss rule even though consumer purchased vehicle "as is").
161. See, e.g., FordMotor Co., 592 N.W.2d 201.
162. NMSA 1978, §§ 55-2-101 to -725 (1961).
163. Id. § 55-2-316.
164. Armijo v. Ed Black's Chevrolet Ctr., Inc., 105 N.M. 422, 424, 733 P.2d 870, 872 (Ct. App. 1987)
(citing Perfetti v. McGhan Med., 99 N.M. 645, 662 P.2d 646 (Ct. App. 1983)).
165. § 55-2-318. It should be noted this section "only addresses horizontal privity, leaving vertical privity
to judicial decision." Arnijo, 105 N.M. at 424, 733 P.2d at 872. New Mexico has abolished the vertical privity
requirement. Perfeni,99 N.M. at 654, 662 P.2d at 655.
166. § 55-2-718.
167. § 55-2-719(i)(a).
168. § 55-2-719(1)(b).
169. § 55-2-719(3).
170. § 55-2-725(1).
171. § 55-2-725(2).
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contemplation of the parties to the contract."' 72 Further, in New Mexico "a party
generally can exempt itself from liability or limit its liability in tort for harm caused
by negligence."' 73 Contractual exemptions are valid for economic damages or
personal injury.'74 And even though a party to a construction contract may not
completely indemnify another party for its own negligence,' 75 limitation of liability
clauses in construction contracts are valid.' 76 All of these limitations on recovery
can drastically diminish a deserving plaintiff's ability to recover from a commercial
entity's breach of contract.
B. UnconscionabilityRarely Provides Recourse for Consumers
One mechanism consumers can use to avoid injustice resulting from one-sided
contracts is to show that entire contracts or specific terms are unconscionable. This
mechanism is largely ineffective, however, because the threshold for unconscionability in New Mexico is "very high." 177 Further, "[ulnconscionability is one of the
most amorphous terms in the law of contracts."' 7 8 With no meaningful way to avoid
unanticipated limitations on remedies and damages, individual consumers who
suffer economic loss are left with no avenue to recovery. 79 Contract law simply
fails to protect consumers in this situation. The very high standard New Mexico
consumers must meet to prove unconscionability, combined with inconsistent
application of standards, renders the device mostly illusory.
Unconscionability relates to "whether there was freely manifested assent to the
bargain."' 8 ° Contracts can be substantively or procedurally unconscionable.18 For
a consumer to prove substantive unconscionability, "[t]he terms must be such as no
man in his senses and not under delusion would make on the one hand, and no
honest and fair man would accept on the other."' 82 A term is procedurally
unconscionable where inequality in bargaining power "is so gross that one party's

172. Martinez v. N. Rio Arriba Elec. Coop., Inc., 2002-NMCA-083,
23, 51 P.3d 1164, 1170. The
combination of this contract rule and the "disappointed expectations" extension of the economic loss rule makes
contract and tort recovery mutually exclusive because a consumer can only recover foreseeable losses in contract
and only unforeseeable losses in tort. See supranote 61 and accompanying text.
173. Berlangieri v. Running Elk Corp., 2003-NMSC-024, 1 26, 76 P.3d 1098, 1106-07 (citation omitted).
The Restatement also recognizes disclaimers and limitations of remedies in the products liability context for harm
to other property. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILTY § 21 cmt. f (1998) ("[C]ontractual
limitations on tort liability for harm to property, when fairly bargained for, may provide an effective way for the
contracting parties efficiently to allocate risks of such harm between themselves.").
174. See Berlangieri,2003-NMSC-024,
17, 76 P.3d at 1104. The UCC does make this distinction:
"Limitation of consequential damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie
unconscionable but limitation of damages where the loss is commercial is not." § 55-2-719(3).
175. NMSA 1978, § 56-7-1 (2005).
176. Fort Knox Self Storage, Inc. v. W. Techs., Inc., 2006-NMCA-096, 1 22, 142 P.3d 1,7 (enforcing clause
limiting defendant's liability to $50,000 even though total damages were over $1,000,000). Fort Knox did not
involve a consumer, and the court did "not mean to suggest that the same result would obtain if the beneficiary of
a similar clause sought to enforce the clause against a consumer rather than a commercial entity." Id. 23, 142 P.3d
at 7.
177. Monette v. Tinsley, 1999-NMCA-040, 19, 975 P.2d 361, 365.
178. 7 JOSEPH M. PER.LO, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 29.1 (rev. ed. 2002).

179. See, e.g., Guthmann v. La Vida Llena, 103 N.M. 506, 709 P.2d 675 (1985).
180. CLAUDE D. ROHWER & ANTHONY M. SKROCKI, CONTRACTS IN A Nurstm. 299-300 (6th ed. 2006).

181. See Guthmann, 103 N.M. at 510, 709 P.2d at 679.
182. Id. at 511, 709 P.2d at 680 (citations omitted).
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choice is effectively non-existent. ' Factors bearing on procedural unconscionability "include the use of sharp practices or high pressure tactics and the relative
education, sophistication or wealth of the parties, as well as the relative scarcity of
the subject matter of the contract."' 4 Other factors are "the particular party's ability
to understand the terms of the contract and the relative bargaining power of the
parties."' 85
The UCC contains its own unconscionability provision applicable to contracts
for the sale of goods. 8 6 Courts can refuse to enforce entire contracts or specific
terms, or to "limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any
88
unconscionable result."1 87 However, the UCC does not define unconscionability. 1
The comments to the section vaguely define "[t]he basic test [a]s whether, in the
light of the general commercial background and the commercial needs of the
particular trade or case, the clauses involved are so one-sided as to be
unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the time of the making of the
contract."l8 9 One commentator summarizes, "A blurred doctrine designed to address
extreme unfairness, unconscionability has been the focus of endless commentary
but has not been a frequent basis for relief."' 90 Thus, although the New Mexico
Supreme Court has declared that "the section sets out what should be the rule under
the common law doctrine of unconscionability as applied to all contracts,"'' the
UCC's unconscionability section is no more helpful than imprecise common law
definitions.
Courts can also refuse to enforce adhesion contracts, or provisions of them, but
only "when the contract or provision is unfair."' 92 An adhesion contract has three
elements:
First, the agreement must occur in the form of a standardized contract prepared
or adopted by one party for the acceptance of the other. Second, the party
proffering the standardized contract must enjoy a superior bargaining position
because the weaker party virtually cannot avoid doing business under the
particular contract terms. Finally, the contract must be offered to the 1weaker
93
party on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, without opportunity for bargaining.

183. Id. at 510, 709 P.2d at 679 (citations omitted).
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. See NMSA 1978, § 55-2-302 (1961).
187. § 55-2-302(1). The Restatement allows the same actions. See RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OFCONTRACTS
§ 208 (1981).
188. § 55-2-302.
189. Id. atcmt. 1.
190. Carol B. Swanson, Unconscionable Quandary: UCC Article 2 and the Unconscionability Doctrine,
31 N.M. L. REV. 359, 359 (2001) (citations omitted).
191. State ex rel. State Highway & Transp. Dep't v. Garley, 111 N.M. 383, 390, 806 P.2d 32, 39 (1991)
(citing RICHARD A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.10 (1984)).

192. Guthmann v. La Vida Llena, 103 N.M. 506, 509, 709 P.2d 675, 678 (1985) (citing Steven v. Fidelity
Cas. Co. of N.Y., 377 P.2d 284, 295, 296-97 (Cal. 1962); C. KAUFMAN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 559A (Supp.
1984)).
193. Guthmann, 103 N.M. at 509, 709 P.2d at 678 (citations omitted).
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The second element is met where the dominant party enjoys a monopoly in the
relevant market, "'or when 1all
the competitors of the dominant party use essentially
94
the same contract terms."",
Parties in New Mexico have been mostly unsuccessful in avoiding unanticipated,
adverse contract terms by relying on unconscionability or the law of adhesive
contracts.'95 The doctrines' two main problems are their conceptually elusive nature
and their failure as meaningful mechanisms for avoiding enforcement of
unbargained-for and unfair contract terms. As a result, New Mexico courts have
applied the doctrine inconsistently.' 96 These cases are the economic loss rule's
contract counterpart. In conjunction, the economic loss rule and unconscionability' s
very high standard can deprive deserving consumers of the protection of tort and
contract law.
V. ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF NARROWING THE GAP
The confluence of the economic loss rule, easily limited or extinguished
contractual remedies, and New Mexico's very high unconscionability standard can
leave many consumers without recovery for devastating economic injury. There is
a void in the law's protection. The void can be narrowed either by supplementing
New Mexico's economic loss rule to exempt consumer transactions, or by lowering
the standard by which consumers prove unconscionability. ' A combination of the
two alternatives is also possible. Each approach has advantages, as well as drawbacks.
A. Exempting Consumersfrom the Economic Loss Rule
One commonly advanced reason for the economic loss rule is that parties to a
contract should be able to set the terms of their own agreements and allocate risk.'98
If the rule were not applied, parties could escape their promises by suing in tort.'99
These reasons make some sense in situations involving sophisticated commercial
entities of comparable bargaining power because parties presumably understand and
assent to all contract terms. 200 However, even between sophisticated parties,

194. Id. (quoting Albuquerque Tire Co., Inc. v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 102 N.M. 445, 448, 697
P.2d 128, 131 (1985)).
195. See, e.g., Garley, 111 N.M. 383, 806 P.2d 32 (lease's allocation to lessor of condemnation proceeds);
Guthmann, 103 N.M. 506, 709 P.2d 675 (nursing home contract's entry fee requirement); Smith v. Price's
Creameries, 98 N.M. 541, 650 P.2d 825 (1982) (wholesale distributorship agreement's unilateral termination
provision); Monette v. Tinsley, 1999-NMCA-040, 975 P.2d 361 (franchise agreement's unequal remedy
provisions). But see Fiser v. Dell Computer Corp., 2008-NMSC-046, 188 P.3d 1215 (arbitration provision in
contract for sale of computer held to be unconscionable).
196. See, e.g., sources cited supranote 195.
197. Directly depriving parties of some ability to contractually limit recovery is not realistic given the clear
statutory ability to do so. See, e.g., NMSA 1978, § 55-2-316 (1961) (specifying requirements for disclaiming
warranties). Further, "[tihe proposition that a person should be able to bargain for any lawful exchange is
unassailable." Michael M. Greenfield, The Role of Assent in Article 2 andArticle 9, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 289, 307
(1997).
198. See, e.g., E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 872-73 (1986); Seely v.
White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 151 (Cal. 1965); Utah Int'l, Inc. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 108 N.M. 539, 542,
775 P.2d 741, 744 (Ct. App. 1989).
199. In re Consol. Vista Hills Retaining Wall Utig., 119 N.M. 542, 550, 893 P.2d 438, 446 (1995).
200. See E. River, 476 U.S. at 872-73.
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implied, unforeseen, and unbargained-for terms may become enforceable parts of
a contract.20' This is particularly true in contracts for the sale of goods, where the
UCC' s2°2 gap filler and warranty provisions can supply terms not contemplated by
the parties.2" 3 This reality undercuts a major premise of the economic loss rule,
particularly when the normal, uninformed, and unrepresented consumer is involved.
Some examples from the UCC demonstrate how even commercial parties do not
always bargain for every term or specifically allocate risk. To begin with, a concept
as basic as the moment of a contract's making need not be determinable. 2 4 Sellers
of goods can create warranties unintentionally. 2 5 Enforceable warrantiesincluding unintentional ones--can be made after contract formation. 206 Section 2207 allows terms to which one or both parties have not assented or even considered
to become part of the contract.20 7 This particular UCC section has been described
as "much maligned" and is attributed with "generat[ing] a significant amount of
litigation every year. 20 8 The section creates "arbitrary and uncertain outcomes,"
imposes upon parties terms they would not "have chosen if they had bargained
about the terms," and creates "incentives for parties to draft completely one-sided
forms in an effort to either get terms that [are] unduly favorable to the drafter or to
preclude getting stuck with the other side's terms., 20 9 Another section of the UCC
imposes terms based on the parties' previous interactions and the norms of the
particular industry, even where the terms do not appear in the parties' contract.21
By restricting consumers to contract claims, the economic loss rule holds them to
"promises" they never contemplated.
Even with its vagaries, the UCC does provide a degree of certainty and
predictability for parties to a contract for the sale of goods.2 1' Other contractual
situations do not enjoy the benefit of a comprehensive framework delineating
parties' default rights and remedies. 1 2 There is even less reason to apply the
economic loss rule against consumers in such contexts. The Wisconsin Supreme

201. See infra text accompanying notes 204-10.
202. NMSA 1978, §§ 55-2-101 to -725 (1961).
203. See infra text accompanying notes 204-210.
204. § 55-2-204(2).
205. Id. § 55-2-313(2) ("It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that the seller use formal
words such as 'warrant' or 'guarantee' or that he have a specific intention to make a warranty....").
206. Id. § 55-2-313 cmt. 7 ("If language is used after the closing of the deal (as when the buyer when taking
delivery asks and receives an additional assurance), the warranty becomes a modification, and need not be
supported by consideration if it is otherwise reasonable and in order...."). "While.. .the Official Comments do not
carry the force of law, they are a part of the official text of the Code adopted by [the New Mexico] legislature and
[courts] do look to them for guidance." Gardner Zemke Co. v. Dunham Bush, Inc., 115 N.M. 260, 265 n.2, 850
P.2d 319, 324 n.2 (1993) (citing In re Anthony, 114 N.M. 95, 98 n.l, 835 P.2d 811, 814 n.l (1992)).
207. See § 55-2-207; see also GardnerZemke, 115 N.M. 260, 850 P.2d 319. This section "provides that a
document responding to an offer and purporting to be an acceptance will be an acceptance, despite the presence
of additional and different terms." 1d. at 263, 850 P.2d at 322. The GardenerZemke court discussed the three
approaches to conflicting terms in exchanged forms and held that in New Mexico the terms cancel each other out
and are replaced by the UCC's general warranty provisions. Id. at 267-68, 850 P.2d at 326-27.
208. RICHARD E. SPEIDEL & LINDA J. RUSCH, COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS, SALES, LEASES AND LICENSES

110 (2d ed. 2004).
209. Id. (citing Daniel Keating, Exploring the Battle of the Forms in Action, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2678 (2000)).
210. See § 55-2-202.
211. See Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Cease Elec., Inc., 688 N.W.2d 462,468-69 (Wis. 2004).
212. See id. at 469.
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Court recently found this difference significant enough to hold the economic loss
rule inapplicable to service contracts. 1 3 The court reasoned that the existence of the
UCC' s rights and remedies "serves as one of the critical rationales underlying the
economic loss doctrine" because allowing a commercial purchaser to sue in tort for
economic loss would circumvent the UCC.21 4 Service contracts are different in that
they do not "enjoy the benefit of well-developed law," and "the built-in warranty
provisions that the U.C.C. may provide in a contract for the sale of products or
goods would not apply to a contract for services. 2, 5 Further, many service contracts
are informal and unwritten, so "few parties actually address the allocation of risk
or the limitation of remedies. 216 Nor do the parties hire counsel to draft their
agreements. 21 7' As the Wisconsin Supreme Court logically observed:
[T]he concept of the parties engaging in discussions of pre-negotiated liability
in the event of breach seems to fly in the face of the reality of routine service
contract relationships. Although the freedom to allocate economic risk by
contract should not be impinged, applying the economic loss doctrine to limit
recovery based on the premise that the parties have indeed exercised that
freedom simply makes no sense.218
The assumption underlying a breach of contract remedy is "that the parties to a
contract can negotiate the risk of loss occasioned by the breach. ' 21 9 In many
consumer transactions this assumption is not met. Thus, "it is appropriate to enforce
only such obligations as each party voluntarily assumed. 22 ° It is unrealistic to
expect normal, unsophisticated consumers to bargain with experienced, sophisticated sellers of goods. 22' This reality was recognized even at the economic loss
rule's inception:
The traditional contract is the result of free bargaining of parties who are brought
together by the play of the market, and who meet each other on a footing of
approximate economic equality. In such a society there is no danger that freedom
of contract will be a threat to the social order as a whole. But in present-day
commercial life the standardized mass contract has appeared. It is used primarily
by [parties] with strong bargaining power and position.222
For these reasons, the dissent in Seely concluded that consumers should be able to
pursue strict liability claims for economic loss, in order to "properly adapt
traditional sales law to the marketing position of today's ordinary consumer.' 223 The

213. Id. at 472. The Cease Electric court's reasoning is not offered as a critique of the Naylordecisions, but
as support for exempting consumers in general from the economic loss rule.
214. Id. at469.
215. Id.
216. Id.at 471.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Robinson Helicopter Co., Inc. v. Dana Corp., 102 P.3d 268, 275 (Cal. 2005) (refusing to bar fraud and
intentional misrepresentation claims with economic loss rule).
220. Id. (quoting Applied Equip. Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd., 869 P.2d 454, 461 (Cal. 1994)).
221. See Sherman v. Johnson & Towers Baltimore, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 499, 501-02 (D. Md. 1990).
222. Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 156-57 (Cal. 1965) (Peters, J.,
dissenting).
223. Id. at 158.
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main policy reasons underlying the economic loss rule simply fall away when
contracts involve ordinary consumers.
The broader policies underlying contract and tort law clarify the distinction the
economic loss rule should make with regard to consumers. The rule is very much
about the distinction between contract and tort, and which policies should prevail
in a given situation.224 The distinction often blurs, however, and contract and tort
' In general, "contract
policies cannot be "easily separated into neat categories."225
obligations arise from promises made between parties. Contract law is intended to
enforce the expectancy interests created by the parties' promises so that they can
allocate risks and costs during their bargaining. 2 26
Tort law protects very different interests. Negligence, for example, serves four
purposes: (1) "redistributing the economic burden of loss from the injured
individuals on whom it originally fell"; (2) deterring unreasonable or immoral
conduct; (3) compensating and satisfying injured victims; and (4) allowing "society
[to] give voice and form to its condemnation of the wrongdoer. ' 227 All of these
"underpinnings of tort law... are applicable regardlessof whether the victim suffers
22 8
economic or physical injury."
Contract policies make sense where sophisticated commercial entities negotiate,
allocate risks, and actually exercise the freedom to contract.22 9 Certainty and
enforceability are perfectly appropriate goals. Tort policies do not make sense here
because there is no need to redistribute loss or deter wrongdoing (to a point, of
course). The parties have already determined their mutual obligations and rights
through contract, so no tort action is necessary.23 ° Conversely, contract policies do
not make sense between parties of unequal bargaining power or where no negotiated
terms protect the weaker party's interest.231 "Freedom of contract" should not be
used to enforce the unilateral economic expectations of the more powerful party
embodied in a one-sided contract. Where the purchaser is not a sophisticated
commercial entity of comparable bargaining power to the seller, the policies
underlying tort law are strong. Economic harm should be distributed and damages
should be borne by the party most capable of foreseeing and bearing them. Powerful
commercial parties should be deterred from selling goods or services that will harm
consumers while at the same time contractually insulating themselves from liability.
Finally, New Mexico courts have only applied the economic loss rule to
sophisticated commercial parties of comparable bargaining power. The Utah
Internationalcourt, in adopting the rule, held "that in commercial settings when
there is no large disparity in bargainingpower, economic losses from a product
224. See Town of Alma v. AZCO Constr., Inc., 10 P.3d 1256, 1259 (Colo. 2000).
225. Berlangieri v. Running Elk Corp., 2003-NMSC-024, 1 20, 76 P.3d 1098, 1105.
226. AZCO Constr., 10 P.3d at 1262.
227. Berlangieri, 2003-NMSC-024, 21, 76 P.3d at 1105 (quoting Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque, 110
N.M. 621,624, 798 P.2d 571,575 (1990), rev'd on other grounds, 1998-NMSC-031,965 P.2d 305). The policies
underlying products liability are very similar. See supra note 20.
228. Berlangieri, 2003-NMSC-024, 22, 76 P.3d at 1105 (emphasis added).
229. See Utah Int'l, Inc. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 108 N.M. 539, 542, 775 P.2d 741, 744 (Ct. App. 1989)
(adopting economic loss rule "in order to allow commercial parties to freely contract and allocate the risk of
defective products as they wish").
230. See id.
231. Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Cease Elec., Inc., 688 N.W.2d 462,471 (Wis. 2004).
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injuring itself cannot be recovered in" tort.232 Six years later, the New Mexico
Supreme Court held "that the economic-loss rule does not bar a claim for
'
In Spectron, the court of appeals
indemnification" because "it would be unjust."233
retained the language from Utah Internationallimiting the rule to commercial
parties with comparable bargaining power, and applied it against a plaintiff with
"more expertise than any other entity in the country regarding" the injured
product.234 A federal district court recently held that the rule applies to service
contracts, but only "when the parties to an agreement are sophisticated commercial
entities.'
Exempting consumers from the economic loss rule is thus one alternative for
narrowing the gap in New Mexico's protection of consumers. However, it is not the
only alternative.
B. Lowering the UnconscionabilityThresholdfor Consumer Plaintiffs
Lowering the unconscionability threshold for New Mexico consumers is the
alternative to exempting consumers from the economic loss rule. New Mexico
statutes and case law support this alternative. Unconscionability's status as "one of
the most amorphous concepts in the law of contracts, 236 encourages judicial
delineation of the doctrine as applied to consumers. Perhaps the most compelling
reason to moderate New Mexico's high unconscionability threshold is that in
comparison to exempting consumers from the economic loss rule, this measure is
less extreme.
New Mexico statutes and case law indicate that consumers should be given an
extra level of protection in contractual situations. For example, the Uniform
Arbitration Act 237 provides that "between a consumer, borrower, tenant or employee
and another party, a disabling civil dispute clause contained in a document relevant
to the dispute is unenforceable against and voidable by the consumer, borrower,
' A "disabling civil dispute clause" is defined as "a provision
tenant or employee."238
modifying or limiting procedural rights necessary or useful to a consumer,
borrower, tenant or employee in the enforcement of substantive rights against a
party drafting a standard form contract or lease., 239 Parties with less knowledge and
bargaining power are thus given special protection by the Act.

232. Utah Int'l, 108 N.M. at 543, 775 P.2d at 745 (emphasis added).
233. In re Consol. Vista Hills Retaining Wall Litig., 119 N.M. 542, 551, 893 P.2d 438, 447 (1995).
234. Spectron Dev. Lab. v. Am. Hollow Boring Co., 1997-NMCA-025, In 20-25, 936 P.2d 852, 857-58.
235. Naylor 1, 452 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1174 (D.N.M. 2006).
236. 7 PERIuLO, supra note 178, § 29.1.
237. NMSA 1978, §§ 44-7A-1 to -32 (2001).
238. Id. § 44-7A-5. While it appears no court has passed on the validity of this provision, "[s]tates may not
subject an arbitration agreement to requirements that are more stringent than those governing the formation ofother
contracts." DeArmond v. Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc., 2003-NMCA-148,1 9,81 P.3d 573,577 (citing Doctor's
Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996)). The provision indicates the legislature's concern for
providing extra protection for consumers in contractual situations, regardless of its validity.
239. § 44-7A-I(b)(4). Among the seven nonexclusive examples of disabling civil dispute clauses in the
statute is a contract clause requiring the consumer to "decline to participate in a class action." Id. § 44-7A-

I(b)(4)(f).
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New Mexico's Unfair Practices Act" is another example of legislative intent to
protect consumers from economic harm in contractual settings. The Act forbids
unfair, deceptive, or unconscionable trade practices,2"' and "is intended to provide
a private remedy for individuals who suffer pecuniary harm for conduct involving
either misleading identification of a business or goods, or false or deceptive
advertising."2 4 An unconscionable trade practice is an act that: "(1) takes advantage
of the lack of knowledge, ability, experience or capacity of a person to a grossly
unfair degree; or (2) results in a gross disparity between the value received by a
person and the price paid. 243
A third act exemplifying the New Mexico legislature's particular concern for
protecting consumers from economic harm in contractual situations is the Uniform
Owner-Resident Relations Act (UORRA). 2 4 Under the Act, if a court "finds that
any provision of a rental agreement was inequitable when made, the court may limit
the application of such inequitable provisions to avoid an inequitable result. 245 The
statute encourages courts to determine "the underlying fairness of the rental
agreement" and to selectively enforce "the contract to bring about an equitable
result., '2' This inequity provision is modeled on the UCC's unconscionability
provision. 247 Like the UCC, the comparable provision in the model act uses the term
"unconscionable., 248 When the New Mexico legislature adopted the Act, it lowered
the standard to "inequitable. '24 9 This change led the New Mexico Supreme Court
to uphold a trial court's decision that a rent set by a landlord at $125 over market
value was inequitable and unenforceable.25 °
Alone, these three acts cannot compensate consumers who suffer economic
injury and who have no recourse due to the economic loss rule, lawfully disclaimed
warranties and remedies, and New Mexico's high unconscionability threshold.
Rather, the acts are legislative embodiments of the necessity for New Mexico law
to provide remedies for seriously injured consumers.
The New Mexico courts' inconsistent application of unconscionability law is
another reason to clarify the doctrine as applied to consumers.2 5' The uncertainty
is not restricted to New Mexico. The word "unconscionable" itself "defies lawyer-

240. NMSA 1978, §§ 57-12-1 to-22 (1967).
241.

Id. § 57-12-3.

242. Parker v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., Inc., 121 N.M. 120, 132, 909 P.2d 1, 13 (Ct. App. 1995)
(citing Stevenson v. Louis Dreyfus Corp., 112 N.M. 97, 100, 811 P.2d 1308, 1311 (1991); Richardson Ford Sales,

Inc. v. Johnson, 100 N.M. 779, 782, 676 P.2d 1344, 1347 (Ct. App. 1984)).
243. § 57-12-2(E).
244. NMSA 1978, §§ 47-8-1 to -51 (1975).

245. Id. § 47-8-12(A).
246. Ramirez-Eames v. Hover, 108 N.M. 520, 522, 775 P.2d 722, 724 (1989).
247. Id.
248. UNw. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD & TENANT ACT § 1.303 (1972).
249. § 47-8-12(A); see also Ramirez-Eames, 108 N.M. at 522-23, 775 P.2d at 724-25 (recognizing
legislature's modification).
250. Ramirez-Eames, 108 N.M. at 523-24,775 P.2d at 725-26. The court stated "although the New Mexico
Uniform Owner-Resident Relations Act generally affirms the ability of the parties to reach their own agreement
on rental price, we believe the equity provisions must be construed as a limitation on this ability." Id. at 523 n.1,
775 P.2d at 725 n.1.
251.

See supraPart IV.B.
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like definition. 252 Despite decades of interpretation of the doctrine, "the arguments
and uncertainty continue unabated. 253 The lack of certainty in this area leaves New
Mexico appellate courts free to articulate a clear, more moderate standard by which
consumers prove unconscionability. Fairness and consistency with legislative intent
would be achieved simultaneously.
VI. IMPLICATIONS
A. Exempting Consumersfrom the Economic Loss Rule
If New Mexico's economic loss rule were to be applied to sophisticated
commercial entities and not to consumers, it would become necessary to define
these parties' places on the sliding scale of commercial aptitude and clout. The
standard for whether a party is a sophisticated commercial entity could be
equivalent to that for qualifying as a merchant under the UCC, 254 whether the entity
provides goods or services. A consumer could be defined as any other party. This
approach has the benefit of predictability in the form of a statutory definition,
scholarship, and well-developed case law.255 It is also flexible because a party may
be a consumer for purposes of a given transaction, and a sophisticated commercial
entity for purposes of another.256 Bargaining power is another important factor when
determining the status of parties for purposes of economic loss rule classification. 57
The greater the disparity in bargaining power, the less reason there is to apply the
economic loss rule against the weaker party.258
At times, normal consumers will voluntarily and knowingly contract with more
powerful, sophisticated commercial entities. Here, the policies underlying the
economic loss rule and contract are strong and the rule should bar the consumer
from bringing tort claims in circumvention of the contract's terms. 259 Tort policies
would not be served by allowing tort actions in such a case. The party's status will
depend on case-specific facts, such as relative bargaining power, the extent of
negotiation, whether terms such as price or warranty were changed, and other
factors bearing on the degree of assent.
252. 7 PERILLO, supra note 178, § 29.4.
253. Swanson, supra note 190, at 359.
254. NMSA 1978, § 55-2-104(1) (1961) provides:

'Merchant' means aperson who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his occupation holds
himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the

transaction or to whom such knowledge or skill may be attributed by his employment of an
agent or broker or other intermediary who by his occupation holds himself out as having such

knowledge or skill.
Id.
255. See, e.g., Fear Ranches, Inc. v. Berry, 470 F.2d 905 (10th Cir. 1972) (discussing whether defendant
ranchers were merchants); Ingrid Michelsen Hillinger, The Article 2 Merchant Rules: Karl Llewellyn's Attempt
to Achieve the Good, the True, the Beautiful in Commercial Law, 73 GEO. L.J. 1141 (1985).

256. This is how the UCC treats merchants. See § 55-2-104 cmt. 2 (Merchant "sections only apply to a
merchant in his mercantile capacity; a lawyer or bank president buying fishing tackle for his own use is not a
merchant.").
257. See Utah Int'l, Inc. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 108 N.M. 539, 543, 775 P.2d 741, 745 (Ct. App. 1989)

("We have decided that in commercial settings when there is no large disparity in bargainingpower, economic
losses from a product injuring itself cannot be recovered in [tort] actions.") (emphasis added).
258. See supra text accompanying notes 231-35.
259. See supra text accompanying notes 229-30.
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In many situations contract remedies will place the consumer "in as good a
position as he would have been in had the contract been performed." 2" Again, there
is no reason to exempt consumers from the economic loss rule by allowing them to
pursue tort theories as an alternative to contract actions. These consumers are
protected by contract and are thus not in the void between contract and tort. The
injustice necessitating alteration of the current non-recovery rules is not present.
For all the compelling reasons to create a partial exemption to the economic loss
rule for consumers, there is one very forceful argument against doing so. It would
be tantamount to imposing a new tort duty upon sophisticated commercial entities
to prevent economic loSS.2 6' The duty to protect against economic loss is normally
a contract concern, and a supplier of goods or services generally has no parallel tort
duty.262 This proposition is fairly novel, and one which courts may be hesitant to
adopt.263 However, this supplement to the economic loss rule would not be an
outright imposition of a tort duty to protect against economic loss in all cases.
Even if consumers were partially exempted from the economic loss rule, the
exemption's novelty and scope would be tempered by several factors. First,
consumers could not bring products liability claims for purely economic loss
because the Restatement specifically limits Section 402A to "liability for physical
harm.' 26 Consumers alleging violation of tort duties would still bear the burden of
proving all the elements of their claims.265 Second, tort actions for economic losses
are presently available to New Mexico consumers in certain instances. For example,
"fraud is an economic tort which protects economic interests." 266 Further, tort
theories are available to consumers where "professional services arising from
contract are substandard. 267 The economic loss rule thus does not bar tort claims
against professionals, even where a consumer suffers economic loss and a contract
exists between the consumer and professional .268 Third, since professional providers
of services currently owe an independent tort duty to consumers to prevent
economic loss, 269 it would not be entirely unfair to extend this duty to professional
providers of goods. Finally, precedent for allowing consumers to pursue tort
remedies as an alternative to contract remedies exists in situations where consumers

260. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 cmt. a (1981).
261. The court in Grynberg v. QuestarPipeline Co., 70 P.3d 1 (Utah 2003), explained that the economic
loss rule's "modem forcus is not on the harm that occurs but instead is on the source of the duty that was
breached." Id. at 11. Since the rule bars tort claims when the duty breached lies in contract, allowing consumers
to sue in tort for economic loss would constitute imposition of a new tort duty on providers of goods and services.
262. See Town of Alma v. AZCO Constr., Inc., 10 P.3d 1256, 1262-64 (Colo. 2000).
263. See Torres v. State, 119 N.M. 609,612, 894 P.2d 386,389 (1995) ("Courts should make policy in order

to determine duty only when the body politic has not spoken and only with the understanding that any
misperception of the public mind may be corrected shortly by the legislature.").
264. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 402A (1965) (emphasis added).
265. For example, "a negligence claim requires the existence of a duty from a defendant to a plaintiff, breach
of that duty, which is typically based upon a standard of reasonable care, and the breach being a proximate cause
and cause in fact of the plaintiff's damages." Herrera v. Quality Pontiac, 2003-NMSC-018, 6, 73 P.3d 181,
185-86.
266. Williams v. Stewart, 2005-NMCA-061, 9 35, 112 P.3d 281,290.
267. Adobe Masters, Inc. v. Downey, 118 N.M. 547, 548, 883 P.2d 133, 134 (1994) (citing Ruiz v. S. Pac.
Transp. Co., 97 N.M. 194, 200, 638 P.2d 406, 412 (Ct. App. 1981)).
268. See NaylorL, 452 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1174 (D.N.M. 2006).
269. Adobe Masters, 118 N.M. at 548, 883 P.2d at 134.
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suffer physical injury or harm to other property.2 7 ° Even with these four mitigating
factors, imposing a new tort duty would constitute a moderately large shift in New
Mexico tort law.
B. Lowering the UnconscionabilityThresholdfor Consumer Plaintiffs
Moderating the unconscionability threshold for consumers is an alternative to
exempting consumers from the economic loss rule. This alternative has support in
statutes and case law.27 ' It is also feasible because the law surrounding unconscionability in general is vague.272 The implications of lowering the unconscionability
threshold for consumers are not severe precisely because of the inconsistency and
lack of clarity surrounding the doctrine. Articulating a more moderate standard by
which consumers prove unconscionability would bring stability to the area.
Defining the new consumer unconscionability threshold may prove difficult,
given the concept's "amorphous" nature.27 3 One option is to draw from UORRA's
"inequitable" provision.274 If a court "finds that any provision of a rental agreement
was inequitable when made, the court may limit the application of such inequitable
provisions to avoid an inequitable result. '275 Courts could consider "the underlying
fairness" of contract provisions and selectively enforce those provisions "to bring
about an equitable result. 276
Another option is to use UORRA's inequitable provision as a jumping-off point
while retaining the current unconscionability framework. If a consumer could show
that a contract clause is inequitable within the meaning of UORRA, the clause
would be presumed unconscionable. The burden would shift to the commercial
party to prove that the clause is not unconscionable. This approach would allow
consumer plaintiffs to meaningfully challenge unfair, unbargained-for terms. It
would not be unduly burdensome for commercial defendants to prove that terms in
contracts they drafted are not unconscionable.
Finally, courts might develop a moderate unconscionability standard for
consumer plaintiffs on a case-by-case basis. This would require courts to critically
assess the circumstances of contract formation and the fairness of contract terms.
Courts must confront disparities in bargaining power and the relative ability of the
parties to prevent and absorb economic loss. These factors must have a direct
bearing on the unconscionability analysis if unconscionability is to be a meaningful
shield against one-sided, unanticipated contract terms.

270. Consumers suffering physical injury from a defective product can bring claims for products liability or
breach of warranty. Perfetti v. McGhan Med., 99 N.M. 645, 653, 662 P.2d 646, 654 (Ct. App. 1983) ("[Iln a
personal injury case, the products liability claim and the claim concerning the implied warranty of merchantability
may be identical."); see also UJI 13-1430 NMRA (In personal injury cases, "both causes of action are available

to the plaintiff.").
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.

See supra Part V.B.
See supra Part V.B.
See 7 PER.Lo, supra note 178, § 29.1.
NMSA 1978, § 47-8-12(A) (1975).
Id.
Ramirez-Eames v. Hover, 108 N.M. 520, 522, 775 P.2d 722, 724 (1989).
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Whatever method is used, lowering the unconscionability standard for consumer
plaintiffs is a practical and viable option for narrowing the gap in the law's
protection of consumers.
VII. CONCLUSION
The economic loss rule, easily disclaimed warranties and remedies, and New
Mexico's very high unconscionability standard can deny deserving consumers
compensation for serious economic injury. There are good reasons to partially
exempt consumers from the economic loss rule. There are also good reasons to
moderate the unconscionability threshold for consumers. However, adjusting the
unconscionability threshold for consumers is a moderate alternative compared with
partially exempting consumers from the economic loss rule. The reason for not
partially exempting consumers from the economic loss rule is a strong one.
Imposing a tort duty upon providers of goods and services to prevent economic loss
is a fairly extreme proposition. To fill the gap in New Mexico's law, either a new
tort duty must be imposed, or an unsettled corner of contract law must be given
definition and certainty. Accordingly, moderating New Mexico's unconscionability
threshold for consumers is the better alternative.

